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ABSTRACT 
Author: Veronica Terese Cote 
Title: Standardized Checklists versus Variable Checklist: 
An Evaluation in a Light Twin Simulator 
Institution: Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University 
Degree: Master of Aeronautical Science 
Year: 1995 
The purpose of this study was to determine if a checklist that varied by sequence 
would enable the pilot to detect potential errors more easily than those who used an 
unchanging checklist. A flight hour based stratified sample of pilots were randomly 
divided into two groups and flew a series of eight flights in a light twin aircraft simulator. 
The control group used the same checklist for each trial; the experimental group used a 
checklist that covered the same items but varied in sequence for each trial. Faults were 
introduced in the last two trials. The number of faults discovered or missed and the time 
required for each subject to perform the pre-departure checklist was recorded. The results 
indicated that there was significant difference in time between groups and over for trials 
(1-6). There was no significant difference between groups after a fault was introduced in 
trials seven and eight. There was no difference in error rate. 
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Introduction 
The purpose of checklists has been to alleviate the burden of pilots which comes 
from trying to remember all the steps necessary to configure the aircraft for various flight 
regimes. The use of standardized checklists began about the time of the US Airmail 
Service and evolved to a complex written list of actions to be performed, a system which 
has not changed in concept from those early days despite the modern computerized 
checklists. 
The checklist is a critical tool for ensuring safe and consistent flight operations. 
Consistent, accurate use of the checklist is a safeguard to ensure that the aircraft is 
properly configured, operations are completed sequentially and efficiently, the aircraft is 
prepared for flight, and the pilot is cognizant of potential problems before leaving the 
ground. 
The importance of checklists have long been recognized to have such a significant 
impact on safety that checklists are required to be accessible and used by the pilot under 
Federal Aviation Regulations (FAR) FAR Part 135, Air Taxi Operators and Flight Rules 
and FAR Part 121, Airline Operations and Flight Rules. The FARs require the checklist to 
include: starting engines check, takeoff check, cruise configuration check, approach check, 
after landing check, and the shutdown check. The FARs also require a checklist for 
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emergency operations of: fuel, hydraulic, electrical, and mechanical systems, emergency 
operations of instruments and controls, engine inoperative procedures, and any other 
emergency procedures necessary for a safe flight (FAR/AIM, 1994). However, the 
Federal Aviation Regulations do not require the use of checklists for FAR Part 91, 
General Operating and Flight Rules. 
Given the importance of correct checklist use, Degani and Weiner (1993) have 
done considerable research into the use of checklists for airline crews. However, their 
research did not consider the implication of checklist use for general aviation pilots. 
Statement of the Problem 
While some research into checklist procedures has been done in the context of 
commercial airline operations, there has been little research with direct relationship to 
general aviation. Clear procedures are established for major and commuter airlines, but 
only recommended in a cursory manner in the typical general aviation aircraft. General 
aviation, i.e., light aircraft flying, is generally done by a single pilot, usually with no formal 
cockpit resource management (CRM) training or the benefits of strict procedural 
indoctrination. Solo flight operations require diligence in checklist procedure because of 
lack of redundancy of another crew member or advanced automation. Therefore, the 
design of a checklist for this type of operation takes on added importance. 
3 
Review of Related Literature 
Purpose of Checklists 
The checklist has been devised over the years as a method of ensuring that critical 
items necessary for the safe operation of complex systems are performed in a sequential 
and logical order. It has been used in aviation extensively and has been the foundation of 
pilot standardization and cockpit safety for years (Degani and Weiner, 1993). It provides 
a method of verification of system components and proper aircraft configuration. The 
checklist is an important backup for pilots to aid in helping them remain focused on the 
task at hand and eliminate guesswork when attention may be divided during periods of 
high workload or periods of stress and fatigue (FAA, 1995). 
The normal checklist is intended to achieve the following objectives: 
1. Provide a standard foundation for verifying aircraft configuration that 
will attempt to defeat any reduction in the flight crew's psychological and 
physical condition. 
2. Provide a sequential framework to meet internal and external cockpit 
operational requirements. 
3. Allow mutual supervision (cross-checking) among crew members. 
4. Dictate the duties of each crew member in order to facilitate optimum 
crew coordination as well as logical distribution of cockpit workload. 
5. Enhance a team concept for configuring the plane by keeping all crew 
members "in the loop". 
6. Serve as a quality control tool by flight management and government 
regulators the flight crews (Degani and Weiner, 1993, p. 347). 
The proper use of checklists is intended to prevent unsafe practices, carelessness 
and the development of individual procedures (USAir, 1991). Another objective of the 
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checklist is to foster a positive attitude toward the use of this procedure (Degani and 
Weiner, 1993). A checklist can only be effective if the pilot is fully aware of the 
importance of the conscientious use of the procedure. 
The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has recognized the importance 
of checklist use and its critical role in flight safety when it called for an intensive checklist 
review following a 1969 crash of a Pan American Boeing 707 (NTSB recommendation A-
69-012). 
The Federal Aviation Administration Office of Integrated Safety Analysis 
conducted a review of aircraft accidents from the period of 1983-1993. The investigation 
revealed that approximately 279 aircraft accidents occurred during operations conducted 
under Federal Aviation Regulations Part 91, 135 and 121. These accidents resulted in 
approximately 215 fatalities and 260 injuries which were a direct result of a situation 
where a checklist was not used or the checklist failed to include critical steps required for 
safe operation (FAA, 1995). 
In a period of about two years, four highly visible accidents took place in which 
incomplete or inaccurate use of the checklist was found to be contributing factor. These 
deadly errors include: the failure of a flight crew of a Jetstream 31 to properly apply 
maximum takeoff power which resulted in a crash immediately after takeoff (NTSB, 
1988b), a rudder mis-trim that contributed to the crash of a US Air Boeing 737-400 from 
La Guardia Airport (Aviation Week and Space Technology, 1990, April 2) and incorrectly 
set flaps or slats which led to the crash of both a Northwest Airlines MD-80 flight 255 at 
Detroit Metro Airport (NTSB, 1988a) and a Delta Airlines Boeing 727 flight 1141 from 
Dallas-Fort Worth (NTSB, 1989). These accidents prompted further study of the human 
factors implication in checklist design and usage (Degani and Weiner, 1990). 
Design and use of the checklist 
Checklist devices used in air transport or military applications include scroll, 
mechanical, electromechanical, video display and paper checklists. The scroll checklist 
consists of a narrow strip of paper that scrolls vertically between two reels and is most 
commonly used in military aircraft. The mechanical checklist consists of a plastic slide 
that is used to cover items completed. The electromechanical checklist is presented as an 
internally lighted display in the cockpit in which the accomplished item is extinguished by a 
toggle switch located beside each item (Degani and Weiner, 1990). The new generation 
of aircraft that has cathode-ray tube (CRT) displays have the capability of presenting the 
checklist on the CRT and then highlighting the item that must be accomplished (Palmer 
and Degani, 1992). 
The most frequently used checklist in all aviation operations consists of a printed 
card with two columns. The left-hand column contains the items that needs to be checked 
visually and/or configured (e.g., "FLAPS;" "GEAR HANDLE"). The right-hand column 
contains the standard response to the challenge (e.g., "SET"; "DOWN-THREE 
GREEN"). This design is used because it is easily updated, reproduced and simple to use. 
The disadvantages are: a lack of a marker-type system to distinguish whether or not an 
item has been completed, lack of a system to alert pilots of a missed item, the need of the 
pilot to hold or position the checklist in a manner that allows it to be easily followed but 
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does not interfere with the required pilot action and the difficulty of reading the checklist 
in low ambient light situations (Degani and Weiner, 1990). 
There are two basic philosophies of checklist design and use. The first is the 
"challenge and response" method, which is most commonly used in airline operations. In 
this method, the pilot first configures the aircraft from memory then the written checklist 
is used to verify that the aircraft is properly configured. During verification, the pilot calls 
out the item, then both pilots visually confirm the status of the item. The copilot then 
responds a standard answer. This method provides redundancy in that both pilots become 
actively involved in confirming the configuration of the aircraft and the checklist reader 
confirms the appropriate response. This method, when carefully performed by the flight 
crew, provides the highest degree of accuracy. 
The second method of checklist use is referred to as a "do-list" which is most 
commonly used by general aviation pilots. In this method, the pilot reads the item and 
then performs the action. If the sequence is interrupted or incomplete, items may missed 
and mistakes may go unnoticed (Degani and Weiner, 1993). Because the pilot does not 
first configure the aircraft from memory, this step by step procedure does not provided the 
redundancy of the challenge and response method. A single pilot operation is at an added 
disadvantage because the experience and aid of another pilot precludes the increased level 
of safety redundancy provides. 
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Checklist content 
There is considerable debate as to which items should be on a checklist. Some 
argue that most of the configuration items should be included because the procedure 
should verify that all required items. Others argue that because a checklist is redundant to 
the pilot's initial configuration, only the critical items should be included. Because of the 
differing philosophies, the exact make-up of the checklist will vary between aircraft and 
between companies flying the same aircraft (Degani and Weiner, 1990). 
The use of on-board computers in sophisticated commercial and corporate aircraft 
has allowed monitoring of aircraft systems. Reliance on automation for aircraft 
configuration warnings is not without its unique problems. Although both the Northwest 
flight 255 and Delta flight 1141 had takeoff configuration warnings that were to alert the 
pilots if the aircraft was not properly configured, in both cases the automation failed to 
detect the absence of flaps and/or slats. 
Automation does not guarantee safety for aircraft configurations (Degani and 
Weiner, 1993; Palmer and Degani, 1991). The lack of complexity of most general aviation 
aircraft preclude the benefits automation provides. Limited electronics and lack of take-
off configuration warnings require the general aviation pilot to rely on the actual execution 
of the checklist and personal experience in the aircraft to ensure that the aircraft is 
properly configured. Most general aviation aircraft do not have sophisticated systems, 
although many do have simple systems. An example of this would be a horn which sounds 
if an aircraft with retractable gear approaches a slow (landing) airspeed without the gear 
extended. Despite this, many aircraft land gear-up every year. What is not known is how 
8 
many accidents are prevented each year by these types of aircraft configuration warning 
systems. 
Checklist design has implications as to whether it will be completed accurately. If 
it is designed so that the pilots consider it cumbersome or an obstacle to complete, it may 
be regarded as a nuisance task and lead to short-cuts or individual procedures (Nagano, 
1975; FAA, 1995). If the checklists are excessively lengthy, pilots may inadvertently skip 
over items (Degani and Weiner, 1993). This short-cutting of checklists, whether 
purposefully or inadvertent, may render it ineffective. 
The order of items on the checklist may also play a critical role in how well the 
checklist is accomplished. "This order of items is the only indicator of the pilot's point of 
progress in the checklist" (Degani and Weiner, 1993, p. 355). One must consider the 
question that a predictable order of items on the checklist may lead to potential problems 
that may be associated with a task that is done repeatedly. Would problems such as 
complacency and reduced sensitivity to the mechanism render the checklist ineffective? 
When taking off or landing an airplane, although the task may be the same, flight 
conditions are unique. No two takeoffs or landings are ever the same due to external 
variables, such as weather, etc. Therefore, the pilot's attention must be at its highest 
during the takeoff and landing parts of the flight. If a method that would allow for the 
same degree of attention could be applied to checklist use, then perhaps vigilance in 
checklist operation would be increased. 
As with many complex machines, certain tasks must be sequenced in a logical 
order according to the activation of systems. Other systems may be checked in a less 
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structured order because each item may not have direct bearing over the item that 
precedes or follows it (Degani and Weiner, 1993). 
The order of checklist items generally follow a pattern of eye and motor movement 
in the cockpit. This is referred to as flow pattern (Degani and Weiner, 1993). 
If the established flow patterns are not logical and the checklist itself correct and 
consistent with procedures prescribed in related manuals, the probability is very 
high that the crew may, when pressed for time, revert to their own methods, cut 
corners, omit items, or even worse, ignore the checklist entirely (FAA, 1995, 
p. 18). 
Degani and Weiner (1993) recommend that very critical checklist tasks be 
accomplished first. They reason that the captain will usually call for the checklist when the 
workload is low and consequently the probability of completion is high. Also, the 
probability of accomplishing subsequent tasks diminishes as time progresses. Degani and 
Weiner (1993) noted that some pilots have developed their own personal check of certain 
"killer items" prior to takeoff. If a checklist is properly designed and executed, then there 
would be no need for a personalized procedure. 
Checklist initiation and interruption 
When a checklist is to be initiation is another important factor in its design and use, 
and may be dependent entirely on the captain. Because of external pressures, such as 
radio communications, ramp personnel, passengers, or other crew members, the checklist 
may be initiated at an inappropriate time. The NTSB surmised from the cockpit voice 
recorder of Northwest flight 255 that the checklist was not completed due to the first 
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officer being distracted at the last minute because of a runway change and the captain's 
passive involvement with checklist initiation (Sumwalt, 1994). 
Checklist interruption and resumption also has an influence in the quality of the 
checklist procedures. A study conducted by Linde and Goguen (1987) found that when 
the checklist is interrupted by ground personnel, air traffic control or other crew members, 
it may not be resumed at the proper place or totally abandoned. Use of an explicit hold, 
such as "hold at name of checklist item " by the initiator of the checklist significantly 
reduces the possibility of an incomplete checklist. "If this is done, the load on memory 
may not be as great, since placing such a hold makes a social acknowledgment of the fact 
that the checklist has been interrupted" (Linde and Goguen, 1987, p.4). 
Single pilot operations do not have the benefit of another crewmember to remind 
them of checklist interruption. Again, the single pilot has to remember to complete the 
checklist if interrupted. If an erroneous cockpit indication is detected during the checklist 
process which requires the pilot to stop and determine the nature of the problem, the time 
to complete the checklist will increase. Although an interruption of this nature may stop 
the flow of the checklist procedure, the additional time may increase the probability of 
error detection and correct checklist completion. This research will explore this element 
of checklist completion. 
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Psychological Factors 
There are several psychological and physiological factors that have implications as 
to whether the checklist is performed in an adequate manner. Fatigue, stress, pilot 
workload and distractions all have bearing on the human element in checklist performance. 
Fatigue can reduce pilot performance because of behavioral changes. One 
compensatory measure a fatigued person may revert to is one of lead shedding or 
workload reduction. A fatigued individual tends to rank tasks to be accomplished 
according to their perceived importance and sheds or deletes those of a lower 
priority. The individual may also refuse to accept new tasks or inputs or may 
devote less time to each of the present tasks. This can directly impact the 
successful completion of a checklist tasking (FAA, 1995, p.9). 
Personal stress unrelated to flying may still manifest itself in pilot behavior by 
markedly decreasing alertness and performance. Emotionally upsetting events such as a 
death of a family member or friend, arguments, financial pressure or job security concerns 
may alter the pilot's ability to concentrate on all the various aspects involved with aircraft 
operations. 
Workload and task management is another area of concern to the pilot. The use of 
the checklist generally occurs in phases of high workload. Based on a review of NTSB 
accident reports and ASRS incident reports, the flight crew is most vulnerable to checklist 
error in flight operations prior to take-off (FAA, 1995). Other research indicated that 
90% of all time-related human errors occurred in the pre-flight or taxi-out phase of 
operations (McElhatton and Drew, 1993). For this reason, this phase of operation is most 
salient to this research. 
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Before taxi, pilots are involved with the numerous activities in preparing for a 
flight. These activities include: gathering and disseminating weather information, 
conducting weight and balance computations, aircraft fueling, baggage loading, passenger 
loading, and briefings. Pilots are also confronted with push-back crews, dispatchers, flight 
attendants, and mechanics, all of whom may make demands on the crew in the pre-taxi 
phase. These interruptions may be non-linear in nature; that is, they may occur at non-
specific times during the pre-taxi phase. It may be the pilot's own judgment as to 
prioritize these issues and attend to them (McElhatton and Drew, 1993). 
In contrast, the approach and landing phase is usually less hectic, more predictable 
and linear in nature. 
The task of landing associated with the arrival sequence to an airport is generally 
spread over a longer time period...and the cues for initiating the checklist are 
normally more pronounced, e.g., descending out of cruise altitude, perform 
"DESCENT" checklist; at or near the final approach fix complete the "BEFORE 
LANDING" checks (FAA, 1995, p. 10). 
This is also true in general aviation flying. While many of the responsibilities of the 
airlines are not present, the interruptions that can occur prior to taxi can be just as 
disruptive, especially if the pilot does not fly often or is inexperienced. 
Human Information Processing 
The cognitive portion of the checklist task involves the processing of information. 
During the checklist procedure, the pilot is to identify potentially hazardous situations. 
More specifically, the pilot must go through a series of psychological processes to 
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determine if the aircraft is configured properly. These include: attending to instrument 
and outside scanning, identifying proper aircraft configurations, and relying on long term 
memory for recall of required configurations. The pilot must also take into account 
previous experience with the route of flight, weather, runway, aircraft performance, and 
air traffic control. How this is achieved can be explored using theories in classic vigilance 
research. 
Memory 
Memory plays an important part in information processing. Unaided working 
memory has been shown to have the capacity of retaining approximately seven (plus or 
minus two) unrelated items. "Unless actively rehearsed, or aided by some external form of 
reminder or memory jogger, information contained in the working memory will generally 
be forgotten in 10 to 20 seconds" (Miller, 1956; Wickens, 1988; Flach, 1988 in FAA, 
1995, p. 12). 
Problems that arise from the memory process are the result of several potential 
information encoding errors. Information encoding errors are failures to properly encode 
the new information in such a way that it can be properly recalled. Encoding errors are 
the result of incorrect mental models. Mental models are formed when a task is repeated 
so often that it becomes rote and set expectations result. 
When a certain task is performed in the same manner, operators become 
experienced with the task. In a sense, they actually create a "mental model" of the 
task. With experience, the shape of the model becomes more rigid, resulting in 
faster information processing, ability to divide attention, and consequently leading 
to a reduction in workload (Degani and Weiner, 1990, p.3). 
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Wrong mental models may occur as a result of insufficient environmental 
information or experience, incorrect expectations of the pilot, or an incomplete mental 
model (Mangold and Eldredge, 1993). Incorrect mental models may result in pilots 
believing that a checklist item is completed when, in fact, they only "saw" what they 
expected to see. "...(T)his (mental) model may adjust, or sometimes override, the 
perception of physical stimuli coming from the receptors and bias the brain" (Degani and 
Weiner, 1990, p.3). This is supported by Aviation Safety Reporting System data and may 
have been the situation for Delta flight 1141 in which the checklist call for flaps was made, 
but the actions were not performed (NTSB, 1989, in Degani and Weiner, 1993). 30 
Davies and Parasuraman (1982) suggest that working memory may play a 
significant role in the cognitive demands of successive vigilance tasks. They identify 
successive discriminations as those in which recall of a standard be compared with the 
signal. In the example of pilots preparing the cockpit prior to checklist use, the entire 
cockpit can be considered a signal. Successive discrimination may be learned in pilots 
with considerable experience in a particular aircraft or when using one checklist 
exclusively. A glance at the cockpit configuration may provide pilots with sufficient 
information with regard to cockpit layout and they may configure (reconfigure) the 
aircraft without the necessity of the checklist. 
Simultaneous discriminations are those in which judgments about the signal are 
made without regard to a remembered standard, i.e., a checklist "do-list" or a checklist in 
which the items are randomized. Simultaneous discrimination may be the preferred 
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method for pilots who use the checklist as a "do-list" without first configuring the aircraft 
from memory out of habit, necessity, or preference. 
Successive discrimination (the visual cockpit check) may have more of a drain on 
the subjects' resources than simultaneous discrimination (use of the checklist). If this is 
the case, there may be less cognitive resources with successive discrimination and may 
cause expectancy in vigilance to be hampered (Davies and Tune, 1969, in Dittmar et al., 
1986). Conversely, simultaneous discrimination, i.e., judgments not compared to a 
remembered standard, would not hamper working memory and therefore may not 
adversely affect vigilance. Simultaneous discrimination would not require the pilot to 
memorize a checklist or the exact aircraft configuration. Consequently, a checklist could 
vary each time and it may not have an influence on the accuracy of the configuration. 
Which type of discrimination is being developed, and which is more desirable for 
the single pilot operation? Does the type of discrimination have bearing on time to 
complete the checklist? If a pilot uses standard checklist exclusively, does successive 
discrimination take place? If so. what is the implication in checklist use? These questions 
will be explored by this research. 
Expectancy Theory 
Dittmar, Zeileniewski, Dember and Warm (1986) conducted a study to determine 
if signal regularity had an effect upon perceptual sensitivity. Expectancy Theory states 
that a person will form a schedule of expectancy of a signal after experience has shown 
approximately when a signal will arise. The subjects will consequently modify their 
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attention and their vigilance remains high. This theory also states that vigilance drops 
immediately after a signal. Dittmar et al. (1986) suggests that Expectancy Theory may 
play a significant role in the vigilance of a subjects. 
The pilot may form schedule of expectancy with regard to particular checklist 
items that trigger a major motor actions. In the case a pre-departure checklist for a light 
twin aircraft, an example of this would be moving the hand to the ignition key. If 
Expectancy Theory holds true for pilots that use the same checklist each time, one might 
suspect that vigilance would alternately be high and low. While attending to each 
individual task, vigilance would be high because each item on the checklist can be 
considered a signal. After each item is accomplished on the checklist, the vigilance for 
that particular item drops. Additionally, if the pilot does not have a second check or the 
benefit of automation, an item that is improperly set may not be discovered until a problem 
develops due the resulting low vigilance after each checklist item (signal) is completed 
(detected). 
A checklist that would allow for continued high vigilance would be desirable. If 
the checklist varies each time, then the pilot would not know exactly when the particular 
item would be on the list. Using the example above, the pilot completes the checklist in 
anticipation of the item that calls for the major motor movement (key the ignition switch). 
This may result in increased vigilance throughout the entire procedure. 
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Automatic and controlled processing 
Fisk and Schneider (1981) suggest that vigilance and associated performance 
decrements are the result of the type of cognitive processing involved in tasks that require 
sustained attention. Schneider and Shiffrin (1977) refer to these processes as automatic 
and control processing, which are quantitatively and qualitatively different. 
Fisk (1985) suggests that the consistency between signals and the subject's 
practice has an effect on vigilance. Fisk and Schneider (1981) concluded that the mode of 
information processing, automatic or controlled, has significant bearings on the ability to 
maintain attention. This leads to two questions: which type of mental processing is 
involved with pilot checklist procedure and what is required to adequately train people to 
perform checklists better? 
Automatic processes are fast, parallel and fairly effortless. They allow 
performance of well-developed, skilled behavior, are not limited to short-term memory 
capacity and they require extensive training to develop. Automatic processes develop in 
situations where subjects consistently respond to stimuli (i.e., they are always attending to 
and are never ignoring a stimulus when it occurs). Automatic processing, although takes 
significant training and exposure to the task, as well as refresher training, have 
significantly better vigilance performance than those tasks that involve control processing. 
Control processes are comparatively slow, serial, effortful and capacity limited. 
Controlled processes deal with novel or inconsistent information and require little training 
to develop. 
18 
Which type of mental processing is preferred for pilots during checklist operation? 
Degani and Weiner (1990) describe checklist use as follows: 
[T]he combined effect of expectation, experience and pattern analyzing mechanism 
is a double edge sword. On one side, this ability makes the user flexible and faster 
in responding to multiple conditions. On the other side, it can lead the operator to 
make a disastrous mistake just because part of the information which was collected 
quickly or without sufficient attention appeared to match the expected condition 
(p. 40). 
The pilot conducting the checklist must first read the item on the sheet, search for 
the item in the cockpit, verify its actual position (state), determine whether the item needs 
to be changed, change the status of the item if appropriate, then check it again to ensure 
that it was done properly. If the checklist in use has the same items in the same order, 
then this task fulfills part of the requirements for automatic processing. However, some of 
the items identified as controlled processes are also required. Each flight may have unique 
characteristics, some of which are: the pilot may not be very familiar with the aircraft or 
route of flight, the pilot may not have current flight time, or the checklist may be new to a 
familiar aircraft. The pilot must spend additional time to determine if the checklist is being 
completed properly. 
Fisk (1985) supports the work of Fisk and Schneider (1981) and Schneider and 
Shiffrin (1977) in which the relationship of automatic or controlled processing has an 
influence on target detection rate. Controlled processing may become automatic when 
given consistent and extensive practice. However, the practice must be consistently 
mapped (CM). 
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"[T]he individuals [must] make the same overt (or covert) response to stimuli (or 
class of stimuli). If the individuals receive varied mapping (VM) training - i.e., a 
given stimulus requires responses that change across time - automatic processing 
will not develop and performance will not substantially change with practice" 
(P-15). 
Checklists that are the never changing may allow for automatic processing of the 
procedure. Training of this type would be considered as consistently mapped (CM) and 
time for checklist completion would decrease. If the checklist varied by sequence, varied 
mapped (VM) training, then automatic processing would not take place and therefore the 
time for checklist completion would not decrease. 
During any checklist that is conducted while on the ground, the pilot is able to 
look as long as necessary to determine if the checklist item is properly configured. 
Because the pilot has this ability to take as much time as necessary during the pre-
departure checklist, the task on the ground differs from a checklist that is conducted while 
under flight. In flight, the pilot's attention must be divided to include the search task while 
flying. In theory, the pilot while on the ground has unlimited time and opportunity to 
discriminate each checklist item and eliminate the errors without time or speed constraints. 
If this is always the case and time is theoretically unlimited, why are checklist errors still 
being made? Two of these reasons may be complacency and the predisposition to hurry. 
Checklist complacency 
Hawkins (1988) suggests that the greatest enemy of error-free discipline checklist 
use is attitude of the pilots involved. This attitude trickles down from airline management 
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to the chief pilot and ultimately to the flight crews. However, in most airline cultures, the 
emphasis is on safety and strict checklist adherence. 
Airline pilots are required to fly many flight segments (each takeoff and landing 
segment is referred to as a "leg") during the course of one day. Pilots generally work 
several days in a row flying a series of flight legs. This is referred to as a trip. This 
requires performing checklists repeatedly, often 3-10 complete (pre-departure to stopping 
engines) checklists per day and as many as 10-30 complete checklist per trip. Commuter 
pilots may have as many as 16 flight legs per day. The requirement to conduct a full 
checklist procedure prior to each flight may be viewed as a nuisance (Degani and Weiner, 
1990). Pilots with more experience may face the prospect of checklist procedure as 
cumbersome to the flight rather than an integral part of the flight itself (Degani, 1993). 
This may lead some pilots to abbreviate the checklist or not use it to back-up their 
configuration of the aircraft. 
Olcott (1991) describes checklists as "tools of the professional" that protect the 
inexperienced pilot against lack of familiarity and guards more experienced pilots from 
complacency. General aviation pilots are at the disadvantage of not having the benefits of 
another cockpit crewmember to guard against abbreviating the checklist. 
Airline philosophy and culture advocates safety, especially with the ever increasing 
acceptance of CRM training which encourages active crew participation in flight deck 
procedures. The single pilot, operating in the general aviation environment, does not 
always have the benefit of crew and company support. Other than mandatory biennial 
flight reviews, general aviation pilots are not required to undergo significant training 
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programs once they leave the flight training environment. The typical general aviation 
pilot may fly with a flight instructor for only one hour every two years. The pilot's own 
individual habits may have evolved from strict checklist discipline while in a training 
environment to individualized procedures that may exclude strict cockpit discipline. 
Additionally, familiarity with only one type of aircraft may lead pilots to expect checklist 
items were completed when in fact they were not (Hawkins, 1988). 
Visual, tactile and motor skills become involved in the verification process. The 
combination of motor movement with mental sequencing process aid the interpretation of 
the checklist item (Degani and Weiner, 1993). Because of familiarity with the checklist, 
the pilot responding may do so without actual verification of the item. The motor skill 
involved with the checklist may become so ingrained that the physical response can 
become as automatic as the non-specific verbal response (e.g., "Checked", "Set"). This 
may render the physical motion ineffective if the pilot is not mentally engaged in the task. 
For example, the captain's call for the checklist may cause the co-pilot to physically touch 
the checklist card, but not remove it from its holder and read the item. Instead, the co-
pilot will perform the checklist from memory. Degani and Weiner (1990) observed this 
behavior during both day and night observations of flight crews. If the pilot reading the 
checklist does not look up and verify the response of the other pilot, the redundancy of the 
check is eliminated. 
It is this habit of rote response that investigators believe contributed to the Delta 
1141 accident. During the analysis of this accident, the NTSB investigation measured the 
time delay between the second officer's challenge ("flaps") and the first officer's reply 
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("Fifteen , fifteen, green light") as recorded in the cockpit voice recorder (CVR). They 
reported that, "...the time between the checklist challenge and responses was less than one 
second, with little time to accomplish actions required to satisfy the proper response 
"(NTSB, 1989 p. 61, inDegani and Weiner, 1990, p. 39). 
Hurry-up Syndrome 
The predisposition to hurry can contribute significantly to degradation in human 
behavior. This is known as the "Hurry-up syndrome" and is defined as "any situation 
where a pilot's human performance is degraded by a perceived or actual need to 'hurry' or 
'rush' tasks or duties for any reason" (McElhatton and Drew, 1993, p. 1). 
A study of ASRS incidents by FAR 121 and 135 operations that contained the 
word "hurry" or "rush" was conducted by McElhatton and Drew (1993). They found that 
the vast majority of time pressure errors occurred in the first two operational phases of 
flight, that is, pre-flight and taxi-out. The results of these errors manifested themselves in 
either the phase where the human error occurred or the phase immediately following. 
They also note that "errors are less likely to be detected in a high-workload, time 
compressed flight phase rather than in a low workload flight phase encountered some time 
after departure" (McElhatton and Drew, 1993, p. 5). 
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Summary 
Aviation accidents have led to the further study of the human factors implication in 
checklist design and usage. Research indicates that 90% of all time-related human errors 
occurred in the pre-flight or taxi-out phase of operations. For this reason, this phase of 
operation is most salient to this research. 
The two basic philosophies of checklist design and use are the "challenge-and-
response" method that is primarily used in airline operations, and the "do-list" which is 
most common in general aviation operations. The most frequently used checklist in all 
aviation operations consists of a printed card with two columns. 
The order of items on the checklist may play a critical role in how well the 
checklist is accomplished. A pilot who uses the same checklist repeatedly may not pay 
sufficient attention to the task. This may lead to rote operation of the checklist procedure 
and, consequently, complacency, which may affect the pilot's mental model of the 
situation. Pilots may expect checklist items were completed when, in fact, they were not. 
A checklist that varied each time may prevent rote execution of the checklist procedure 
and prevent it from becoming routine. More cognitive resources may be dedicated to 
checklists attention which may result in longer time to execute the checklist. Thus, the 
pilot may be provided with more time to carefully analyze the aircraft configuration and 
detect potential errors. 
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Hypothesis 
Pilots in training may be so accustom to using a fixed, unchanging checklist that 
unchallenged repetition may lead to cockpit complacency indicated by procedural errors. 
It is hypothesized that a checklist that had a randomized order would result in fewer errors 
than an unchanging checklist. Additionally, the randomized order would increase the time 
it takes the pilot to perform the checklist. 
Method 
Subjects 
The subjects for the study were Bridgewater State College students who held at 
least a student pilot certificate, had completed at least one solo cross country, and logged 
a minimum of three hours in the ATC-810 multi-engine simulator. A request for 
volunteers was made through the aviation classes. They each filled out a form that 
contained their name, phone number, total flight hours, total time in the ACT-810 
simulator and their availability for the study. The names, phone numbers and availability 
times were required to efficiently schedule their times for the study. All of the subjects 
were required to have at least three hours logged in the simulator within the past four 
months. 
Because the preliminary request for volunteers indicated a wide diversity of flight 
hours, licenses, ratings, and hours in the simulator, it was suspected that this varied 
experience level may have a significant impact on the outcome of this study, the 
simulator is primarily used by the college to teach navigation and instrument procedures. 
Although simulator hours may affect the ease with which the subject flies the simulator, it 
may not have as much bearing on actual flight performance as total flight hours. 
Therefore, the subjects were categorized by total flight hours and a stratified random 
sample was generated. Stratification is shown in Table 1. 
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There was one student pilot, five private pilots, six instrument-rated private pilots, 
seven commercial/instrument pilots and one flight instructor. Each of these groups were 
randomly divided. Half were selected as control subjects and the other half were subjected 
to experimental conditions. Overall, one female and nineteen males participated in the 
study. 
Although a few of the subjects were multi-engine rated, most were not. The 
subjects were informed that during the study they would not be subject to any in-flight 
engine failures or emergencies. 
Equipment 
The ATC-810 simulator and the standard ATC-810 checklist at Bridgewater State 
College were used in this study (see Appendix A). The ATC-810 simulates a single-pilot, 
light twin-engine airplane, similar to a Piper Navajo or the twin-Cessna 340, 402, 414 
series. It is equipped with standard cockpit displays for altitude, airspeed, vertical speed 
and turn coordinator, a flight director, and horizontal situation indicator (HSI). 
Navigation and communication radios are standard dual nav/com type with two very high 
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frequency omi-directional range radios (VORs, one of which is displayed on the HSI), two 
standard communications radios, one automatic direction finder/radio magnetic indicator 
(ADF/RMI) unit and a distance measuring equipment (DME) indicator. 
The checklists were broken down into five groups of items: PREFLIGHT, 
STARTING, TAXI CHECK, TAKE-OFF/CLIMB, AND LEVEL OFF/CRUISE. The 
pre-landing, approach, landing and stopping engines procedures were not included in the 
study because the trials were terminated when the subject reached the predetermined 
checkpoint on their flight. 
The "Starting Engines" checklist was of primary focus in this study because most 
of the errors committed in a checklist procedure occur during the execution of the 
preflight checklist (McEllhatton and Drew, 1993). For the varied checklist used in the 
experimental group, randomization of the sequence of the items in the "Starting Engines" 
checklist was accomplished without adversely affecting the outcome of the checklist 
procedure. In a few, select instances, the items on the checklist could not be logically or 
appropriately varied. Those sequences were: the turning on the simulator sequence and 
the engine start sequence. These two sequences were at the very beginning and the ending 
portions of the "STARTING" checklist respectively. 
There were twenty-five items on the "STARTING" checklist. Items four through 
nineteen were presented in randomized order. Those items were written on a piece of 
paper and placed in a hat. The papers were then drawn for order of their new sequence 
for the varied checklist. There were eight different checklists generated in this manner. In 
order to give the appearance of uniformity, there were no indications on the front of the 
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checklist (the only side with written items) that would indicate which checklist was being 
used. The checklists were numbered on the back in the upper right-hand corner in pencil 
that indicated which varied checklist it was. There were also eight control checklist 
generated. For each trial of the control groups, the subjects received a different copy of 
the same checklist. The checklists used in both groups can be found in Appendix A. 
Procedure 
The subjects were informed that intent of the research was to determine their 
accuracy throughout all aspects of flight. It was intended that the subject be unaware of 
the specific intent of the research so as to not to unduly influence them to pay special 
attention to the checklist. Each subject participated in the study independently; there were 
no concurrent trials. 
Prior to participating in the study, each subject completed an informed consent 
form which stated that participation was voluntary and the results would be anonymous. 
This form can be found in Appendix B. 
The subject was handed a clipboard that held the trip sheet and the checklist and 
was instructed not to write on the checklist. The researcher then explained the procedure 
that would be followed during the study. 
Each subject was involved in one two hour session which involved eight trials. 
Group I, the control group used the same checklist for each trial. Group II, the 
experimental group, used the varied checklist for each trial. For each trial the subjects 
were instructed to perform a pre-departure checklist and proceed to the first checkpoint of 
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a cross country flight in the simulator. They were each given an instruction sheet that 
contained departure instructions, as well as headings and courses to fly. They were also 
instructed to record the time on take-off and reaching the checkpoint. All frequencies 
were given to the subject and each departure was reviewed with the subject by the 
researcher at the conclusion of the "TAXI CHECK". Upon reaching the first checkpoint, 
the simulator was frozen which indicated the end of that particular trial. The subject was 
then asked to leave the room for twenty seconds and the simulator was then reset. During 
that time, the checklists were exchanged. The control group received a new copy of the 
standard checklist while the experimental group received a new varied checklist. These 
were reattached to the clipboard in the same manner as the subject had been using. The 
subjects were asked to return to the simulator when the twenty seconds had expired. This 
process was repeated for all trials. The trip sheets for the subject's flights can be found in 
Appendix C. 
Of the eight trials, the first six contained no unusual events. The remaining two 
trials, 7 and 8, each contained two random faults in the cockpit that would be discovered 
if the checklist was properly used. This is represented in Table 2. 
The faults were randomly assigned from a list of faults determined by expert 
opinion to be of a typical nature for a light twin aircraft. The experts consulted were the 
Bridgewater State College flight simulator lab instructor and the coordinator of the 
College's Aviation Science program. These faults were set in the cockpit as appropriate 
when the subject was out of the room. 
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An error was said to have occurred if: the fault was not found, the fault was found 
but not acted upon, or the fault was found but acted upon incorrectly and the subject 
elected to take-off. The data was categorized as being "fault found" or "fault missed". If 
the fault was found then no error will have occurred. 
The period from the time the subject turned the key switch (item 2 on both 
checklists) until the point where the subject turned on the radio (item 23) was recorded. 
These points were chosen because there was a very definable motor movement by the 
subject that would indicate exactly where the subject was on the checklist. This data was 
recorded (see Appendix E). 
It was anticipated that the subjects could commit errors that were not in the 
experimental design, however, no such errors were observed. 
Results 
Errors 
Total errors committed in the control group were four errors in trial seven and two 
errors in trial eight, thus making a total error rate of six for the control group. The total 
errors committed by the experimental group was one error in trial seven and five errors in 
trial eight, thus making a total error rate for the experimental group of six. This is shown 
in Table 3. 












Thus, the research hypothesis that stated that there would be a difference in error rate 
between the two groups is not supported. A chi square test was performed to determine if 
there was a significant difference between groups as a function of trials. The results of the 
chi square test indicated that there was no difference: observed x2=3.08 critical x2=3.84. 
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Effect of checklist design on time 
The times of both groups to perform the checklist is shown in Figure 1. 
Figure 1. Graph of the times of the control and experimental groups. 
A two-factor mixed design, repeated measures on one factor analysis of variance 
was conducted to determine if there was a statistical difference between the times of the 
control group and the experimental group to complete the checklist for trials one through 
six. This is shown in Table 4. 
The times, means, and errors of the subjects can be found in Appendix F. Also, 
the subject's total flight hours and hours in the ATC-810 can be found in Appendix F. 
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Therefore, it is concluded that the results indicate a significant difference for 
conditions (checklist) and trials (learning): Critical F(1;18) 4.41; Fc(5,90) = F5>60,4.76. 
There was no significant interaction between the groups. 
The ANOVA also revealed a significant difference in time for trials one through 
six: Critical F=4.44, observed F=12.51. This indicated that learning took place over trials 
one through six. 
A three-factor mixed design-repeated measures on two-factors analysis of variance 
was performed to determine if there was a significant difference on time between the two 
groups on trials five and six (no faults) versus trials seven and eight (introduced faults) at 
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the p_ =.05 level of significance. There was no significant difference found. The results are 
shown in Table 5. 
Table 5. A three-factor mixed design-repeated measures on two-factors analysis of 
variance comparing time to perform the checklist between trials five and six 
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The results of this study do not support the research hypothesis that a checklist 
which covered the required items but varied by sequence would reduce procedural errors. 
There was no difference in the total error rate between groups. There was a statistical 
difference in time to complete the checklist between groups and over trials (1-6). There 
was no statistical significance between groups after a fault was introduced in trial seven 
and eight. 
Observations 
Both the variable checklist and the standard checklist provided the required 
foundation for verifying aircraft configuration. The subjects seemed to be well aware of 
the importance of the checklist and had a positive attitude toward the procedure. None of 
the subjects attempted to perform the flight without using the checklist. 
The subjects had no questions as to how to use the checklist. Their simulator and 
flight training experience involved use of a checklist card. As expected, nearly all of the 
subjects performed the checklist as a "do-list." The training environment for single pilot 
operations encourages this type of checklist use. Some of the subjects read aloud both the 
left and right columns (challenge and response) while they performed the procedure. One 
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subject, however, used the airline approach to checklist use; a measure of redundancy to 
back-up an initial configuration. A review of this individual's experience revealed that his 
flight time was the second highest (over 800 flight hours), and his flight experience 
extremely varied. It included may different types of aircraft simulator hours, including B-
727 and B-747 simulator time. Interestingly, his time to complete the checklist was the 
longest of all the subjects. 
Because the ATC-810 simulated a light-twin aircraft, it also had some simple 
automation. For example, when the landing gear fault was introduced in the cockpit by 
having one of the three green (gear safe) lights extinguished, the warning horn sounded if 
the throttles were set at the full idle detent. Some of the subjects, upon hearing the horn, 
did not fully realize what had triggered it. It took some time before they noticed that one 
of the landing gear bulbs was extinguished. It was then that they realized that their check 
of the gear position lights at the beginning of the checklist was deficient. 
Only a few of the subjects in the experimental group noticed that each checklist 
was different. This may have occurred because the flow pattern changed with each 
checklist. It is uncertain if the all the subjects in the experimental group noticed the 
randomized order of the checklist items. Of the subjects that did notice a difference, it is 
uncertain whether it caused them pay special attention to the checklist. Post-test 
interviews may have provided some insight into what the subjects observed. No post trial 
interviews were performed in this study. 
It was also observed that many of the subjects touched items that were on the 
checklist without actually looking at the item (e.g., LANDING GEAR...DOWN). This 
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was observed in both groups. In some instances, an error resulted, in other instances, the 
item was later verified visually. Although a motor movement is recommended by Degani 
and Weiner (1990), they also recommend that this movement be accompanied by a visual 
check at the same time. 
The specific faults that were randomly set and those missed by the subjects are 
shown in Table 6. 




































It is interesting to note that the faults most commonly missed in this study were the 
tripped circuit breaker fault and the roll trim. The circuit breaker that was tripped was the 
right engine oil temperature gauge. The subjects that were randomly assigned the circuit 
breaker fault had a resulting fault of an inoperative oil temperature gauge. This gave the 
subjects two clues of an existing fault: the white band of a tripped circuit breaker and the 
corresponding inoperative electrical gauge. Failure to detect both cockpit indications had 
to occur in order for the fault to be counted. 
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One possibility why the subjects missed both of these clues is that the subject's 
flight or simulator training may not stress verification of the circuit breakers. The circuit 
breaker in the simulator is different from the type that is most commonly used in training 
aircraft. The simulator circuit breaker more closely resembles one that can be manually 
tripped and reset, such as those found in more sophisticated aircraft. In most single engine 
aircraft, the circuit breaker can only be reset after it trips due to an electrical problem. 
This may have resulted in the subjects' failure to recognize the tripped circuit breaker. 
The circuit breakers were located directly in front of the pilot. The right engine oil 
temperature gauge that became inoperative as a result of the tripped circuit breaker was 
located near the top, right hand corner of the instrument panel. Even thought the checklist 
called for verification of oil temperature after engine start, the inoperative gauge was not 
detected. There are several possible explanations for this. The subjects may not have 
checked the gauge, may not have looked at the correct gauge, or incorrectly interpreted 
the gauge. If the subject did not interpret the gauge correctly, then the subjects may have 
experienced an incorrect mental model. The subject may have perceived that the gauge 
was operating properly, when, in fact, it was inoperative. 
The roll trim was the other most commonly missed fault. There are several 
possible explanations for this. Roll trim is rarely present in basic training aircraft. The 
subjects may have only been exposed to it in the simulator. The attention that the subjects 
gave to the roll trim as a result may have been high, due to it being novel and unusual, or 
it may have been ignored because the subjects had little practical experience with it in 
training aircraft. 
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The failure to detect the roll trim fault may also have been a result of incorrect 
information processing. The subject may have misinterpreted the visual stimulus of the 
gauge and "saw" only what they expected to see. It can also be theorized that these 
particular faults occur most frequently because these items are infrequently manipulated by 
the pilot. The subjects that missed the roll trim during the checklist became acutely aware 
of the incorrect setting after lift off when the aircraft began to roll sharply. 
While the possibility existed for the checklist to be abandoned or resumed at an 
improper place when interrupted by a fault, this was not observed for any of the subjects. 
It was also noted that some of the subjects put their thumb at the point on the checklist 
where the interruption took place so they could resume without skipping any items. 
The introduction of most faults caused the subjects to stop and spend whatever 
time necessary to determine the nature of the fault. However, in two instances, the 
subjects experienced no checklist interruption because they did not discover the faults. 
The physiological and psychological status of the subjects was not inventoried. 
Therefore it cannot be determined if fatigue, stress, or major emotional events had any 
negative bearing on the subject's performance. 
The time of each of the eight trials was brief, approximately fifteen minutes. 
Hence, a checklist was performed eight times in the two hour test trial. Although learning 
would have taken place outside the controlled environment, the compressed time frame 
may have hastened familiarity with the checklist. Learning took place as indicated by a 
steady decrease in time in both groups from trials one through six, with a learning plateau 
attained by trials five and six. 
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Analysis 
Even though the time to complete the checklist was not statistically different 
between the two groups, it is interesting to note that the mean times for each of the trials 
of the experimental group was less than those of the control group. This was unexpected. 
It was expected that the pilots in the control might develop automatic processing and 
result in faster completion time of the checklist. It is unclear which type of discrimination, 
successive or simultaneous, if any, was developed. It may be that the number of trials was 
insufficient for the subjects to develop automatic processing. More trials may have had a 
greater impact on the subject's ability to develop automatic processing of the checklist 
procedure. 
It was anticipated that repetition of an unchanging checklist would result in an 
overall shorter time than the variable checklist. Because the sample size was small (n=20), 
this result may be due to sampling error and/or individual differences of the subjects. 
There may have been insufficient subjects and insufficient number of trials to accurately 
test the research hypothesis. Secondly, the subjectis total flight hours and hours in the 
ATC-810 varied widely: the subjects were stratified based on total flight time. Further 
analysis may determine if ATC-810 simulator hours had a bearing on the observed 
differences. 
It is also possible that the subjects had too little overall flight experience to become 
complacent. They were all involved in a flight training environment and most likely to be 
conscientious in the performance of the checklist. The flight training environment at the 
college stresses the importance of safety which may have had influence on the research 
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results. It cannot be determined if additional flight experience would have increased or 
decreased the overall error rate or how it would have affected the overall time to complete 
the checklist. 
Another plausible explanation for this unexpected result could be the measure 
itself. The number of items that were involved in the randomization was fourteen. Even if 
sampling error did not take place, this checklist may not have been complex enough to 
reveal a difference between fixed and varied checklists. Perhaps a more complex single-
pilot aircraft would have a checklist of correspondingly greater detail that would require 
greater vigilance. 
A variable that was not explored in this research was that of time pressures or 
constraints. The time/accuracy trade-off may play a role in error detection. In real world 
flight scenario, pilots are constantly under time pressure, whether overtly by airline 
schedules, weather, flight/duty time limitations, ramp or taxiway congestion, or covertly 
by passengers or the pilot's own desire to get into the air. Perhaps the error rate would 
have increased if the subjects were given a "clearance void time" to simulate a time 
pressure and have resulted in a predisposition to hurry. Further research into this area is 
recommended. 
Conclusion 
Aircraft checklist design and use has received considerable attention in recent years 
as a result of several unfortunate accidents due to checklist misuse. Because of lack of 
sophisticated recording devices, it is unclear how many general aviation accidents are a 
result of checklist misuse or non-use. 
The results of this study indicate that the pilots in this training environment commit 
the same amount of errors regardless of whether the items on a checklist are in the same 
order or vary each time. Therefore, it is inconclusive whether a randomized checklist 
would be more advantageous for the general aviation pilot. 
Recommendations for further research 
It is recommended that further research into this area be conducted using a far 
greater number of trials to increase the likelihood of automatic processing taking place. It 
would also be interesting to investigate how many trials and checklist procedures would 
be required to determine where complacency may override checklist discipline. 
Another area for further investigation would be to determine how many variable 
checklists would be necessary to provide the level of uncertainty or limited expectation 
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that would cause an increase in time and hopefully, accuracy. However, any checklist, if 
used frequently enough, will be at risk of becoming routine. 
It is also recommended that further research investigate the possibility of time 
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APPENDIX A 
STANDARD ATC-810 CHECKLIST 
VARIABLE CHECKLISTS 
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ATC 810 CHECKLIST 
Standard Checklist 
PREFLIGHT 
































































ROCKER SWITCH ENGAGE 
1000 RPM 
CHECK (Yellow arc) 
ON (Set departure frequencies) 
ON (Standbv code as assigned) 
SET(Runwav Heading) 
INBOARD TANKS for take-off 
AS PER FLIGHT PLAN 
RELEASE 







43 in He & 2575 RPM 
85kts 
UP (positive rate) 
120 KIAS (10 degree pitch attitude) 
SET (40 in. Hg & 2400 RPM) 
OFF (Check Pressure) 
(a). 500' PRIOR TO ALTITUDE 
CLOSED 
NOSE DOWN/LEVEL 
SET 37 in Hg . 2100 RPM. 130 PPH Fuel 
OFF (if desired) 
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ATC 810 CHECKLIST 
Variable Checklist 1 
PREFLTGHT 
































































ROCKER SWITCH ENGAGE 
1000 RPM 
CHECK (Yellow arc) 
ON (Set departure frequencies) 
ON (Standbv code as assigned) 
SET(Runwav Heading) 
INBOARD TANKS for take-off 
AS PER FLIGHT PLAN 
RELEASE 







43 in He. & 2575 RPM 
85kts 
UP (positive rate) 
120 KIAS (10 degree pitch attitude) 
SET (40 in. He. & 2400 RPM) 
OFF (Check Pressure) 
(a). 500' PRIOR TO ALTITUDE 
CLOSED 
NOSE DOWN/LEVEL 
SET 37 in. He.. 2100 RPM. 130 PPH Fuel 
OFF (if desired) 
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ATC 810 CHECKLIST 
Variable Checklist 2 
PREFLIGHT 
































































ROCKER SWITCH ENGAGE 
1000 RPM 
CHECK (Tellow arc) 
ON (Set departure frequencies') 
ON (Standbv code as assigned) 
SETtRunwav Heading) 
INBOARD TANKS for take-off 
AS PER FLIGHT PLAN 
RELEASE 







43 in He & 2575 RPM 
85kts 
UP ("positive rate) 
120 KIAS HO degree pitch attitude) 
SET (40 in Hg & 2400 RPM) 
OFF (Check Pressure) 
(a). 500' PRIOR TO ALTITUDE 
CLOSED 
NOSE DOWN/LEVEL 
SET 37 in. Hg . 2100 RPM. 130 PPH Fuel 
OFF (if desired) 
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ATC 810 CHECKLIST 
Variable Checklist 3 
PREFLIGHT 
































































ROCKER SWITCH ENGAGE 
1000 RPM 
CHECK (Tellow arc) 
ON CSet departure frequencies') 
ON (Standbv code as assigned) 
SETfRunwav Heading) 
INBOARD TANKS for take-off 
AS PER FLIGHT PLAN 
RELEASE 







43 in He. & 2575 RPM 
85kts 
UP (positive rate) 
120 KIAS (10 degree pitch attitude') 
SET (40 in. Hg. & 2400 RPM) 
OFF (Check Pressure") 
(a). 500' PRIOR TO ALTITUDE 
CLOSED 
NOSE DOWN/LEVEL 
SET 37 in. Hg.. 2100 RPM. 130 PPH Fuel 
OFF (if desired") 
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ATC 810 CHECKLIST 
Variable Checklist 4 
PREFLTGHT 
































































ROCKER SWITCH ENGAGE 
1000 RPM 
CHECK fYellow arc} 
ON (Set departure frequencies) 
ON CStandbv code as assigned) 
SETfRunwav Heading) 
INBOARD TANKS for take-off 
AS PER FLIGHT PLAN 
RELEASE 







43 in He. & 2575 RPM 
85kts 
UP (positive rate) 
120 KIAS (10 degree pitch attitude) 
SET (40 in. He. & 2400 RPM) 
OFF (Check Pressure) 
(a). 500' PRIOR TO ALTITUDE 
CLOSED 
NOSE DOWN/LEVEL 
SET 37 in. He.. 2100 RPM. 130 PPH Fuel 
OFF (if desired) 
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ATC 810 CHECKLIST 
Variable Checklist 5 
PREFLIGHT 























































SET (3 AXIS Takeoff Position) 
DOWN 







ROCKER SWITCH ENGAGE 
1000 RPM 
CHECK (Yellow arc) 
ON (Set departure frequencies) 
ON (Standbv code as assigned) 
SET(Runwav Heading) 
INBOARD TANKS for take-off 
AS PER FLIGHT PLAN 
RELEASE 







43 in He & 2575 RPM 
85kts 
UP (positive rate) 
120 KIAS (10 degree pitch attitude) 
SET (40 in He & 2400 RPM) 
OFF (Check Pressure) 
fa). 500' PRIOR TO ALTITUDE 
CLOSED 
NOSE DOWN/LEVEL 
SET 37 in Hg. 2100 RPM. 130 PPH Fuel 
OFF (if desired) 
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ATC 810 CHECKLIST 
Variable Checklist 6 
PREFLIGHT 





















































OPEN 1/4 " 
UP 
ONrBOTH) 








ROCKER SWITCH ENGAGE 
1000 RPM 
CHECK fYellow arc) 
ON (Set departure frequencies) 
ON CStandbv code as assigned1) 
SETfRunwav Heading") 
INBOARD TANKS for take-off 
AS PER FLIGHT PLAN 
RELEASE 







43 in He. & 2575 RPM 
85kts 
UP (positive rate") 
120 KIAS HO degree pitch attitude") 
SET T40 in. Hs. & 2400 RPM) 
OFF (Check Pressure") 
(a). 500' PRIOR TO ALTITUDE 
CLOSED 
NOSE DOWN/LEVEL 
SET 37 in. Hg.. 2100 RPM. 130 PPH Fuel 
OFF ("if desired") 
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ATC 810 CHECKLIST 
Variable Checklist 7 
PREFLTGHT 































































OPEN 1/4 " 
ROCKER SWITCH ENGAGE 
1000 RPM 
CHECK (Yellow arc) 
ON (Set departure frequencies') 
ON (Standbv code as assigned) 
SET(Runwav Heading) 
INBOARD TANKS for take-off 
AS PER FLIGHT PLAN 
RELEASE 







43 in He. & 2575 RPM 
85kts 
UP (positive rate) 
120 KIAS (10 degree pitch attitude) 
SET (40 in. He. & 2400 RPM) 
OFF (Check Pressure) 
(a). 500' PRIOR TO ALTITUDE 
CLOSED 
NOSE DOWN/LEVEL 
SET 37 in. Hs.. 2100 RPM. 130 PPH Fuel 
OFF (if desired) 
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ATC 810 CHECKLIST 
Variable Checklist 8 
PREFLTGHT 






















































SET (3 AXIS Takeoff Position) 
DOWN 








ROCKER SWITCH ENGAGE 
1000 RPM 
CHECK (Yellow arc1) 
ON (Set departure frequencies) 
ON (Standbv code as assigned) 
SET(Runwav Heading) 
INBOARD TANKS for take-off 
AS PER FLIGHT PLAN 
RELEASE 







43 in He. & 2575 RPM 
85kts 
UP (positive rate) 
120 KIAS (10 degree pitch attitude) 
SET (40 in. He. & 2400 RPM) 
OFF (Check Pressure) 
r5). 500' PRIOR TO ALTITUDE 
CLOSED 
NOSE DOWN/LEVEL 
SET 37 in. Hg.. 2100 RPM. 130 PPH Fuel 
OFF (if desired) 
APPENDIX B 
INFORMED CONSENT FORM 
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Informed Consent Form 
I, agree to participate in a research 
experiment on Accuracy In Fight simulator study, which is being 
conducted by Veronica T. Cote. I understand that participation is 
voluntary. I may withdraw my participation at any time and have 
the results of my participation returned to me, removed from the 
experimental records or destroyed. The following points have 
been explained to me: 
• The purpose of this experiment, which is to determine the 
accuracy of pilots operating a light twin engine simulator. The 
benefits that I may expect to obtain from my participation are 
two hours of dual instruction in the ATC-810 fight simulator 
which will be free of any fee for the instruction or the flight. 
• Participation will involve neither risk, discomfort, or stress 
during the study. 
• The results of the study will be confidential and will not be 
released in any individually identifiable form without my prior 
consent unless required by law. 
• The researcher will answer any further questions about the 
study, upon request. 
Signature of Researcher Signature of Participant 
Date Date 
PLEASE SIGN BOTH COPIES. KEEP ONE AND RETURN 





Please follow the directions for the following flights. Be sure to record takeoff time 
(local) and the time upon reaching the checkpoint. Try to be as accurate as possible. 
FLIGHT #1 
Depart runway 5L at PVD. Fly runway heading until reaching 2000'. Turn right, proceed 
direct to the FLR (Fall River NDB). Report reaching FLR NDB and record time. 
Com#l 120.7 Nav#l 109.3 Nav#2 115.6 ADF 406 Squawk 5637 
Take-Off time: Checkpoint time: 
FLIGHT #2 
Depart runway 5L at PVD. Fly runway heading until reaching 2000'. Turn left, intercept 
PVD 360° radial until reaching 15 DME. Report reaching the 15 DME and record time. 
Com#l 120.7 Nav#l 109.3 Nav#2 115.6 ADF 406 Squawk 5637 
Take-Off time: Checkpoint time: 
FLIGHT #3 
Depart runway 5 at EWB. Fly runway heading until reaching 1400'. Turn left, proceed 
direct to FLR (Fall River NDB). Report reaching and record time. 
Com#l 118.10 Nav#l 109.7 Nav#2 115.6 ADF 406 Squawk 5637 
Take-Off time: Checkpoint time: 
FLIGHT #4 
Depart runway 5 at EWB. Fly runway heading until reaching 1800'. Proceed direct to 
TAN (Taunton NDB). Report reaching TAN NDB and record time. 
Com #1 118.10 Nav#l 109.7 Nav#2 115.6 ADF 227 Squawk 5637 
Take-Off time: Checkpoint time: 
61 
FLIGHT #5 
Depart runway 5 at EWB. Fly runway heading until reaching 1000' Turn right and 
proceed direct to the MVY VOR. Report reaching the MVY VOR and record time. 
Com#l 118.10 Nav#l 109.7 Nav#2 114.5 ADF 274 Squawk 5637 
Take-Off time: Checkpoint time: 
FLIGHT #6 
Depart runway 6 at ACK. Fly runway heading until reaching 2500', then turn right and 
proceed to the ACK VOR. Continue to climb to 4000. Report reaching the ACK VOR 
and record time. 
Com#l 118.30 Nav#l 109.1 Nav#2 116.2 ADF 248 Squawk 5637 
Take-Off time: Checkpoint time: 
FLIGHT #7 
Depart runway 6 at ACK. Fly runway heading until reaching 1000'. Turn left, proceed 
direct to the MVY VOR at 1000'. Report reaching the MVY VOR and record time. 
Take-Off time: Checkpoint time: 
FLIGHT #8 
Depart runway 24 at MVY. Fly runway heading until reaching 800'. Turn left, proceed 
direct to the ACK VOR while continuing to climb to 2800' Report reaching ACK VOR 
and record time. 
Take-Off time: Checkpoint time: 
Thank you for your assistance in this research effort. It has been greatly appreciated. 
APPENDIX D 
LIST OF RANDOM FAULTS 
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Faults set during trials 7 and 8 
The following are the faults that were randomly selected and set during trials 7 and 








































Raw data for control and experimental groups 
Time is given is seconds. 




Total Flight Hours 
HoursinATC-810 
Errors set 7 














Errors found 7 















Total Flight Hours 
HoursinATC-810 
Errors set 7 
Errors set 8 












Errors found 7 















Total Flight Hours 
HoursinATC-810 
Errors set 7 














Errors found 7 
















Total Flight Hours 
Hours inATC-810 
Errors set 7 














Errors found 7 















Total Flight Hours 
Hours inATC-810 
Errors set 7 














Errors found 7 















Total Flight Hours 
Hours inATC-810 
Errors set 7 














Errors found 7 

















Total Flight Hours 
HoursinATC-810 
Errors set 7 














Errors found 7 















Total Flight Hours 
HoursinATC-810 
Errors set 7 














Errors found 7 















Total Flight Hours 
HoursinATC-810 
Errors set 7 














Errors found 7 


















Total Flight Hours 
HoursinATC-810 
Errors set 7 














Errors found 7 
















Total Flight Hours 
HoursinATC-810 
Errors set 7 














Errors found 7 















Total Flight Hours 
HoursinATC-810 
Errors set 7 














Errors found 7 















Total Flight Hours 
HoursinATC-810 
Errors set 7 














Errors found 7 
















Total Flight Hours 
Hours inATC-810 
Errors set 7 














Errors found 7 















Total Flight Hours 
Hours inATC-810 
Errors set 7 














Errors found 7 















Total Flight Hours 
Hours inATC-810 
Errors set 7 














Errors found 7 

















Total Flight Hours 
Hours inATC-810 
Errors set 7 














Errors found 7 















Total Flight Hours 
Hour s inATC-810 
Errors set 7 














Errors found 7 















Total Flight Hours 
Hour s inATC-810 
Errors set 7 














Errors found 7 

















Total Flight Hours 
HoursinATC-810 
Errors set 7 














Errors found 7 














FLIGHT HOURS, SIMULATOR HOURS OF SUBJECTS 
CHECKLIST COMPLETION TIMES AND FAULTS MISSED 
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Checklist Completion Times and Faults Missed 
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